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Less Myth, More Measurement: Decomposing 
Excess Returns from the 1989 Minimum Wage Hike
* 
 
In the book Myth and Measurement, Card and Krueger (1995) examine the economic impact 
of the 1989 minimum wage hike on the welfare of 110 firms which employ a disproportionate 
number of minimum-wage workers. Their results show mixed evidence that excess returns 
associated with news about the 1989 minimum-wage legislation. This paper re-examines this 
question by decomposing excess returns. Our simple and intuitive approach attributes 
excess returns to either differences in market performances (economy-wide factors) or firm-
specific traits (individualistic factors). We likewise show that, generally, minimum wage 
legislation had little or no effect on employer wealth. However, by decomposing total excess 
returns, we find that the apparent lack of an effect is a consequence of two off-setting forces: 
(1) a negative effect arising from firm-specific traits (adverse information on minimum-wage 
worker employers) and (2) a positive effect arising from market performance. In other words, 
we show that while the aggregate effect of the 1989 minimum wage hike was neutral, there 
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1.  Introduction 
In comparison with the vast literature on the effects of the minimum wage on 
employment and wages, research of the influence of minimum wages on firm profits has 
been rather sparse. Given that most of the theoretical models of the minimum wage start 
from the assumption that firms operate in a way that maximizes profits (or minimizes 
costs), the models predict an increase in the minimum wage will reduce firm profits. 
However, there are only a few empirical studies that examine the effects of the minimum 
wage on profits. 
  One recent study that addresses this question is Draca, Machin, and Van Reenan 
(2011). They directly estimate the link between profits and the re-introduction of the 
minimum wage in the United Kingdom using firm-level data on profit margins. Their 
study shows that the introduction of the minimum wage had a negative effect on the 
profitability of low-wage employers in the United Kingdom. Neumark and Wascher 
(2008) state results that seem reasonably well supported by the data and consistent with 
most theoretical models of the low-wage labor market.  
  In the book Myth and Measurement, Card and Krueger (1995) examine the 
economic impact of 1989 minimum wage hike on the welfare of 110 firms which employ 
a disproportionate number of minimum wage workers. They combine data on stock 
returns with news about the minimum wage legislation to conduct an event study of the 
effects of changing expectations about future minimum wage increases on firm profits. 
Their results show mixed evidence that excess returns associated with news about the 
1989 minimum wage legislation are generally unsystematic and rarely seem to affect 
employer wealth. In this paper, we re-examine this question by introducing an approach 
to decomposing excess returns.  This simple and intuitive approach attributes excess 
returns to either differences in market performances (economy-wide factors) or firm-
specific traits (individualistic factors). 
  Our results confirm Card and Krueger (1995), showing that, generally, the 
minimum wage legislation had little or no effect on employer wealth. However, by 
decomposing total excess returns, we find that the apparent lack of an effect is a 
consequence of two off-setting forces: (1) a negative effect arising from firm-specific 
traits (adverse information on minimum-wage worker employers) and (2) a positive effect 2 
 
arising from market performance. In other words, we show that while the aggregate effect 
of the 1989 minimum wage hike was neutral, there was a significant negative impact on 
firms that was neutralized by positive market performance. 
  In section 2, we introduce the approach. Section 3 is the application in which we 
re-examine the results of the 1989 minimum wage hike in Card and Krueger (1995).  
Section 4 is the conclusion. 
2.   Decomposing Excess Returns 
2.1.  Sources of Return 
In the discussion of the sources of return, we often identify sources of return that 
originated from the issuer of the security (the firm) and sources of return that affected 
securities in general. The firm-specific return is usually called unsystematic return, 
because it is unique to each issuer of securities and does not affect all financial securities. 
The market-related return affecting all securities is called the systematic return. In other 
words, the security return can be divided into two components: a systematic component 
that is correlated with the overall market performance and an unsystematic component 
that is independent of the market. That is, 
Security return = Systematic return + Unsystematic return 
  In order to analyze or measure the degree of systematic and unsystematic return 
that a security contains, a model of the return-generating process must be identified. A 
widely accepted model to achieve this is called the “market model”. The classic market 
model is shown by equation(1): 
  it i i mt it RR      (1) 
 
2 []0      [] ,
i it it EV a r      
where: 
it R  the return on the ith security during time t; 
i    the intercept of the regression model; 
i    the slope of the regression model which is a measure of systematic risk of the ith 
security; 
mt R  the random return on the market index during time t; 
it   the disturbance term of security iduring time t. 3 
 
In general, equation (1) identifies a linear relationship between the return on the market 
( mt R ) and the return on an individual security ( it R ) during time t.  
  In addition to the return on security, investors are also interested in its risk or 
variability. Chen and Keown (1981) show that the variance of a security’s return is the 
sum of the degree of systematic risk and the degree of unsystematic risk which is 
contained in the total risk of the security.
2 Therefore, by decomposing the variance of the 
security’s return, one can know how much of the risk of an individual security return is 
due to the market (systematic risk) and how much is due to the firm (unsystematic risk).  
  Besides the risk of a security’s return, excess returns to a security is of high 
interest for researchers and investors. However, unlike risk of a security’s return, it is 
unclear how much of the excess returns can be attributed to market performance or firm-
specific traits. In the next section, we introduce a simple and intuitive approach to address 
this question by attributing excess returns to either differences in market performances 
(economy-wide factors) or firm-specific traits (individualistic factors). 
2.2.   Decomposing Excess Returns 
An often used methodology to study labor market outcomes by groups (gender, race, etc.) 
is to decompose mean differences in log wages based on regression models in a 
counterfactual manner. Decomposition techniques for linear regression models have been 
used for many decades. This heterogeneous collection of techniques is more generally 
referred to as regression standardization (Althauser and Wigler 1972, Duncan 1969, 
Duncan, Featherman and Duncan 1968, Coleman and Blum 1971, Coleman, Berry, and 
Blum 1971, Winsborough and Dickinson 1971). Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) 
introduced regression decomposition to the economics literature. 
  As stated in Powers, Yoshida and Yun (2011), decomposition is widely used in 
social research to quantify the contributions to group differences in average predictions 
from regression models. The technique utilizes the output from regression models to 
parcel out components of a group difference in a statistic (such as a mean or proportion) 
which can be attributed to differences between groups (i.e., differences in characteristics, 
endowments, or attributes) and to differences in the effects of characteristics (i.e., 
                                                 
2 The process is called variance decomposition. The variance of the return for an individual security is often 
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i   the estimated slope from the estimation period of firm i; 
ˆP
i   the estimated slope from the post-event day period of firm i; 
N
m R   the mean market performance return from the estimation period; 
P
m R  the mean market performance return from the post-event day period. 
  At industry level, the mean excess return of an industry containing N firms is, 
 
11 1
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   
 
        (4) 
After the estimation period, we can get the ex post estimated systematic risk  ˆ P   and ex 
post individualistic component  ˆ
P  . 
P
m R is the ex post mean market return. Therefore, 
equation (4) can be expressed as, 
 
11
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  (5) 
  The mean excess returns  i AR of industry i can then be decomposed into three 
terms. The first and second terms represent the parts that are not explained by the market. 
More precisely, the first term represents how much of the excess returns can be attributed 
to differences in firm-specific traits. The second term represents the mean excess returns 
which can be attributed to differences in systematic risks,  . The third term represents 
the part that is explained by the market which is equivalent to differences in market 
performances. 
  To illustrate the approach, in the next section we first replicate the results of 
Chapter 10 in the book Myth and Measurement by Card and Krueger (1995). Then we 
employ the approach to re-examine the effect of 1989 minimum wage hike.  6 
 
3.  Revisiting Myth and Measurement 
3.1.  A Brief Look at Events Leading to the 1989 Minimum-Wage Legislation
3 
To examine the stock market’s reaction to news about the minimum wage, it is important 
to identify events that change investor’s expectations about the future course of the 
minimum wage. Card and Krueger (1995) use past issues of the Wall Street Journal and 
other sources in order to identify key events connected to 1989 legislation on the 
minimum wage. 
  Periodically since 1938, the U.S. Congress has amended the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA) to increase the level of the minimum wage. In the years between increases, 
the real value of the minimum wage has been eroded by inflation, causing a sawtooth 
pattern in the real value of the minimum over time. In 1977, the U.S. Congress amended 
the FLSA to raise the minimum wage to $2.65 per hour in 1978, to $2.90 per hour in 
1979, to $3.10 per hour in 1980, and to $3.35 per hour in 1981.  
  Under President Reagan, the historical pattern of periodic increases in the 
minimum wage was halted. In all likelihood, investors came to regard the prospects of a 
minimum wage increase in the Reagan era as remote and lowered their forecasts of the 
long-run level of the minimum wage. 
  In March 1987, Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative Augustus Hawkins 
introduced legislation to increase the minimum wage to $4.65 per hour by 1990. In June 
1987, President Reagan signaled that he might soften his opposition to a minimum wage 
increase if the legislation were weakened to include a subminimum wage for youths. 
Hearings lasting several months were held on the proposed increase. On September 19, 
1988, then-Vice President Bush announced during the presidential campaign that he 
would support an increase in the minimum wage. Later that month, however, a 
Republican-led filibuster in the Senate thwarted the Kennedy and Hawkins effort to 
increase the minimum wage. The vote fell five votes short of reaching cloture. 
  In early March of 1989, Congress and President Bush again considered the issue. 
The Bush administration signaled that it would propose increasing the hourly minimum 
to $4.25 by 1992, provided that employers were allowed to pay a short-term “training 
                                                 
3 This section is adapted from Card and Krueger (1995) pp. 328-29. 7 
 
wage” of $3.35 to youths. Shortly thereafter, the Senate Labor Panel voted 11 to 6 in 
favor of raising the minimum to $4.65 per hour. The administration signaled its resolve to 
veto any legislation that would “go beyond its proposal of raising the minimum to $4.25 
per hour, with a training wage of $3.35”. On March 23, 1989, the House voted by a 248 
to 171 margin on H.R. 2 to raise the minimum to $4.55 per hour by 1991. The White 
House reiterated its resolve to veto his legislation. Nonetheless, the Senate followed the 
lead of the House and, on April 12, 1989, voted 62 to 37 in favor of the Senate minimum 
wage increase bill S-4. In mid-May 1989, after a conference, both house of Congress 
approved a bill to raise the minimum wage to $4.55 per hour. The number of votes in 
favor of this legislation in both the Senate and the House, however, fell short of the 
margin required to override a presidential veto. President Bush vetoed the legislation on 
June 13, 1989. Although a veto had been threatened, the actual veto was significant 
because it was the first of Bush’s presidency. The following day, the House again voted 
on H.R. 2, and, as expected, the vote fell short of the required number to override a veto. 
  The U.S. Congress took up the minimum wage again in the fall of 1989. The 
House Labor Panel voted to increase the minimum to $4.25 per hour over two years, and 
to set a 60-day subminimum wage. Labor Secretary Elizabeth Dole reiterated the 
President’s intention to veto any bill that increased the minimum wage to more than 
$4.25 per hour in less than three years. On November 1, 1989, the Wall Street Journal 
reported that President Bush and Congressional Democrats had reached a compromise 
agreement on the minimum wage, clearing the way for eventual passage of the 
legislation. On November 1, 1989, the House passed H.R. 2710 by a margin of 382 to 37. 
This bill increased the minimum wage to $3.80 per hour on April 1, 1990, and to $4.25 
per hour on April 1, 1991, and created a 60-day youth subminimum wage. One week 
later, the Senate passed identical legislation by a vote of 89 to 8. 
3.2.  Implementation 
From Card and Krueger (1995) Table A.10.1, we collect daily stock return data on the 
same sample of 110 publicly-traded firms that are particularly likely to have been 
affected by the 1989 minimum wage increase. The sample consists of 110 firms in the 
restaurant, department store, grocery store, merchandise store, variety store, hotel and 
motel, linen supply, and motion picture theater industries. Companies in these industries 8 
 
tend to employ a disproportionate number of minimum wage workers. A complete list of 
the firms is included in Appendix Table A 1. 
  Daily stock returns for the 110 companies and market returns are obtained from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Then we run a daily stock return 
model using equation (1). Formally, we estimate the “normal performance” of firm i in 
the one year prior to the minimum-wage legislation using equation (6): 
  it i i mt it RR      (6) 
where  it R is the return on the common stock of firm ion day t, adjusted for stock splits 
and dividends;  mt R is the return on the equally-weighted NYSE/AMEX portfolio on day 
t.  i   and  i  are regression coefficients; and  it  is the error term for firm ion day t.  
  To be consistent with Card and Krueger (1995), equation (6) is estimated using 
data on returns in 1987 to get the normal performance of each company. Next, the mean 
predicted return of each company after an event from day 1 to day 10 is obtained by 
estimating equation (6). Mean excess returns ( AR) are then calculated and decomposed 
for each company on each day. Lastly, using equation (5) the result attributes the excess 
returns immediately to differences in firm-specific traits, systematic risks and market 
performances. Formally, the implementation steps are summarized as, 
1.  Run a daily stock return market model to get the normal performance for each 
firm. 
2.  Estimate the post-event performance to get the predicted return for each firm. 
3.  Decompose excess returns using equation (3)
4. 
4.  Analyze the results. 
3.3.  Less Myth, More Measurement 
Card and Krueger (1995) quantify the impact of minimum-wage legislation on firm 
profits. Their results show mixed evidence that news about a minimum wage hike 
induces investors to adjust their valuation of firms downward. Excess returns associated 
with news about the 1989 minimum-wage legislation are generally unsystematic. They 
conclude that in the sample of events they have examined, news about a minimum wage 
                                                 
4  Excess return decomposition results can be obtained using mvdcmp, the Stata program, by Power, 
Yoshioka and Yun (2010). The program is available at http://www.tulane.edu/~msyun/research.htm 9 
 
hike rarely seems to have effect on shareholder wealth. 
  In this section, we re-examine their results using the method developed in the 
previous sections. Card and Krueger (1995) describes 20 newsworthy events leading up 
to the 1989 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act. The descriptions are generally 
based on the title of the Wall Street Journal’s article on the event. The date corresponds to 
the publication date of the article; the event usually occurred on the preceding day. There 
are six minimum-wage legislation events which Card and Krueger (1995) show are 
interesting and worth examining.
5 Their results show that almost all the mean excess 
returns are small and not statistically significant from zero. On the day that the event was 
described in the Wall Street Journal, only two of the twenty mean excess returns are 
statistically significant different from zero at the 10% level. 
  To be comparable, we replicate their results and show that the graphs (Figure 2 to 
Figure 7) are identical to those in Card and Krueger (1995). These six legislation events 
are: 
1.  June 12, 1987: Reagan may ease minimum wage stand. 
2.  March 4, 1988: Panel votes to sharply boost minimum wage. 
3.  September 27, 1988: Democrats' bid to boost minimum wage thwarted by GOP 
filibuster. 
4.  March 3, 1989: Bush to propose raising minimum wage $4.25 to lower training 
wage. 
5.  June 14, 1989: Bill on raising minimum wage vetoed by Bush. 
6.  November 1, 1989: Compromise bill on minimum wage reached and the House 
passed H.R. 2710 by a margin of 382 to 37. 
3.3.1.  June 12, 1987 - Headline: Reagan “May” Ease Minimum Wage Stand 
On June 12, 1987, Wall Street Journal reported that Reagan signaled he might soften his 
opposition to a minimum wage increase. Figure 2 depicts the 10 days mean excess return 
and cumulative mean excess return around June 12. Table 1 reports the two-fold and 
three-fold decomposition result of excess returns from day 1 to day 10.  
  It seems this news may have a negative effect on the profits of the sample 
                                                 
5 Card and Krueger (1995) pp.334-337. 10 
 
companies, but the signal that Reagan “may” ease minimum wage stand doesn’t sound 
strong and decisive which the direction of the impact is likely to be ambiguous. In fact, 
from Table 1 although the post-event mean excess return is .247% and significant at 1% 
level, we find that 35% of the mean excess returns is explained by the market 
performance and is significant at 10% level, though 65% of the mean excess returns is 
not explained by the market and is not statistically significant.  Furthermore, we found 
that almost all (64.917%) the excess returns can be attributed to difference in firm-
specific traits ( ) and very little (.003%) can be attributed to difference in systematic 
risks (  ). However, both are not statistically significant from zero. Hence, the 
insignificant decomposition results support the prediction of Card and Krueger (1995).  
Figure 2  June 12, 1987: Reagan “May” Ease Minimum Wage Stand 
 
 
Table 1  June 12, 1987: Reagan “May” Ease Minimum Wage Stand 
Prediction: Ambiguous or Negative Effect  Day 1-10 (%) Share 
Mean Excess Return  .24738*** 
(.085362)  100% 
Explained by the Market  .086779* 
(.052248)  35.08% 
Not Explained by the Market  .1606 
(.10008)  64.92% 
Mean Excess Return  .24738*** 
(.085362)  100% 
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(.052248) 
Due to Differences in Systematic Risks    7.3119e-06 
(1.3225e-04)  .003% 
Due to Differences in Firm-specific Traits  .1606 
(.10015)  64.917% 
 
3.3.2.  March 4, 1988 - Headline: Panel Votes to Sharply Boost Minimum Wage 
On March 4, 1988, Senate Panel votes to sharply boost minimum wage. When the news 
was released, the interpretation should be adverse to employers’ profit. Card and Krueger 
(1995) predict a negative effect on the wealth of sample companies. They show that the 
cumulative excess return is decreasing after March 4 as shown in Figure 3, but neither 
cumulative excess return nor mean excess return is statistically significant from zero. 
  Table 2, however, offers a different perspective than Card and Krueger (1995). By 
decomposing excess return, we find that even though the post-event mean excess return is 
only 0.077% and not significant, the strong pull and push between market and non-
market forces play a very active role. The market performs exceptionally well from day 1 
to day 10 (compared to its 1987 performance) which should drive the profits of the 110 
sample companies up by a large magnitude. Nevertheless, the news of March 4 generates 
another strong but negative effect on the sample companies which offsets most of the 
increase. The three-fold result in the lower panel of Table 2 supports the findings because 
the difference in systematic risk only plays a very little role compared to the firm-
specific traits,  . 
  Card and Krueger (1995) show the news on March 4, 1988 has an insignificant 
but negative effect on minimum wage firms’ wealth. We show that although the effect is 
not significant, the news that Senate Panel voted to sharply boost the minimum wage 
indeed had a strong and significantly negative impact on the firms’ wealth. But as the 
market was performing exceptionally well, the negative impact is neutralized. 12 
 
Figure 3  March 4, 1988: Panel votes to sharply boost minimum wage 
 
 
Table 2  March 4, 1988: Panel votes to sharply boost minimum wage 
Prediction: Negative Effect  Day 1-10 (%) Share 
Mean Excess Return  .077749 
(.093774)  100% 
Explained by the Market  .44996*** 
(.092915)  578.72% 
Not Explained by the Market  -.37221*** 
(.13201)  -478.72% 
Mean Excess Return  .077749 
(.093774)  100% 
Due to Differences in Market Performances  .44996*** 
(.092915)  578.72% 
Due to Differences in Systematic Risks    9.2706e-04 
(9.2680e-04)  1.20% 
Due to Differences in Firm-specific Traits  -.37313*** 
(.13266)  -479.92% 
 
3.3.3.  September 27, 1988 - Headline: Democrats' Bid to Boost Minimum Wage 
Thwarted by GOP Filibuster 
On September 19, 1988, Bush announced during the presidential campaign that he 
“could” support an increase in the minimum wage. After six days, a Republican-led 
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minimum wage. The vote fell five votes short of reaching cloture. According to Card and 
Krueger (1995), the event contains the strongest evidence that investors view a 
minimum-wage hike as having negative consequences for corporate profits. Figure 4 
shows the cumulative excess returns around the time of the final cloture vote on the 
Republican-led filibuster of the Kennedy-Hawkins minimum-wage bill. The cumulative 
excess return in the 10-day interval around the successful filibuster was nearly 4%. 
Moreover, negative excess returns are apparent a few trading days before the final cloture 
vote, which coincides with the date of an earlier vote on cloture. 
  Table 3 reports the mean excess returns in the 10-day interval is 0.42% and 
significant. In the 10 days, 81.6% of the mean excess return cannot be explained by the 
market which means the event has a significant and large effect on the sample companies; 
on the other hand, only 18.4% can be explained by the market.  This point can be 
supported by looking at the three-fold decomposition. The difference in systematic risks 
is small and not significant. 
  Our results here further support the argument of Card and Krueger (1995) and 
show that firm-specific characteristics account for more than 80% of the good news to the 
firms to the event on September 27, 1988.  Market performance only contributes 18%. 
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Table 3  September 27, 1988: Democrats' bid to boost minimum wage thwarted by 
GOP filibuster 
Prediction: Positive Effect  Day 1-10 (%) Share 
Mean Excess Return  .42005*** 
(.094595)  100% 
Explained by the Market  .077214*** 
(.025621)  18.38% 
Not Explained by the Market  .34283*** 
(.098003)  81.62% 
Mean Excess Return  .42005*** 
(.094595)  100% 
Due to Differences in Market Performances  .077214*** 
(.025621)  18.38% 
Due to Differences in Systematic Risks    -4.2676e-04 
(.0010391)  -.10% 
Due to Differences in Firm-specific Traits  .34326*** 
(.098279)  81.72% 
 
3.3.4.  March 3, 1989 - Headline: Bush to Propose Raising Minimum Wage $4.25 to 
Lower Training Wage 
After failing to increase the minimum wage in the Senate in September of 1988, in early 
March of 1989, Congress and President Bush again considered the issue. On March 3, 
1989, the Bush administration signaled that it would propose increasing the hourly 
minimum to $4.25 by 1992, provided that employers were allowed to pay a short-term 
“training wage” of $3.35 to youths. The prediction of the effect on employers’ wealth can 
be negative or ambiguous when the news was released as merely a proposal. Investors 
should be more responsive to news which is decisive to the increase of minimum-wage 
legislation. 
  Graphically in Figure 5 we see little change before and after March 3. The post-
event 10-day mean excess return is 0.126% which is also not significant from zero. 
However, decomposition results show that approximately 85% of mean excess return can 
be attributed to differences in market performances and is statistically significant at 1% 
level. Differences in systematic risk is significant at the 10% level but only contribute 
0.78% of the mean excess return. Although differences in firm specific-traits contribute 
14%, it is not statistically significant. 15 
 




Table 4  March 3, 1989: Bush to propose raising minimum wage $4.25 to lower 
training wage 
Prediction: Ambiguous or Negative Effect  Day 1-10 (%) Share 
Mean Excess Return  .12594 
(.076941)  100% 
Explained by the Market  .10732*** 
(.013991)  85.22% 
Not Explained by the Market  .01862 
(.078203)  14.78% 
Mean Excess Return  .12594 
(.076941)  100% 
Due to Differences in Market Performances  .10732*** 
(.013991)  85.22% 
Due to Differences in Systematic Risks    9.8981e-04* 
(5.9451e-04)  0.78% 
Due to Differences in Firm-specific Traits  .01763 
(.078311)  14.00% 
 
3.3.5.  June 14, 1989 - Headline: Bill on Raising Minimum Wage Vetoed by Bush 
On June 13, 1989, President Bush vetoed the minimum-wage legislation. Although a veto 
had been threatened, the actual veto was significant because it was the first of Bush’s 
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vote fell short of the required number to override a veto. Card and Krueger (1995) show 
that the event has no effect on sample companies, as is apparent from Figure 6. The post-
event mean excess return 0.009% is small. Although their prediction is correct, it is not 
statistically significant.  
  Though their results show no effect, by decomposing excess return we found that 
85% of it can be significantly attributed to differences in market performances. The 
differences in systematic risks   is -4%, which is not significant from zero. However, 
the differences in firm-specific traits contributes 18.5% of the excess return which is 
consistent to the prediction albeit statistically insignificant. 
Figure 6  June 14, 1989: Bill on raising minimum wage vetoed by Bush 
 
 
Table 5  June 14, 1989: Bill on raising minimum wage vetoed by Bush 
Prediction: Positive Effect  Day 1-10 (%) Share 
Mean Excess Return  .0091909 
(.08159)  100% 
Explained by the Market  .007856*** 
(.0022258)  85.476% 
Not Explained by the Market  .0013348 
(.081618)  14.524% 
Mean Excess Return  .0091909 
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Due to Differences in Market Performances  .007856*** 
(.0022258)  85.476% 
Due to Differences in Systematic Risks    -3.6858e-04 
(9.0407e-04)  -4.010% 
Due to Differences in Firm-specific Traits  .0017034 
(.081647)  18.534% 
 
3.3.6.  November 1, 1989 - Headline: Compromise Bill on Minimum Wage Reached 
and the House Passed H.R. 2710 by a Margin of 382 to 37 
The U.S. Congress took up the minimum wage again in the fall of 1989. On November 1, 
1989, the Wall Street Journal reported that President Bush and Congressional Democrats 
had reached a compromise agreement on the minimum wage, clearing the way for 
eventual passage of the legislation. On November 1, 1989, the House passed H.R. 2710 
by a margin of 382 to 37. This bill increased the minimum wage to $3.80 per hour on 
April 1, 1990, and to $4.25 per hour on April 1, 1991, and created a 60-day youth 
subminimum wage. One week later, the Senate passed identical legislation by a vote of 
89 to 8. 
  Figure 7 depicts the mean excess return and cumulative mean excess return of this 
event. From the figure it is difficult to see whether the news has a negative effect on 
employer wealth. Table 6 shows that the post-event mean excess return is -0.011% but 
not significant. By decomposing the negative excess return, we find that only 15.5% is 
explained by the market and largely 84.5% is not explained by the market though it is not 
significant from zero. By examining further, we found that 46% can be significantly 
attributed to differences in systematic risks    at 5% level; 38% can be attributed to 
differences in firm-specific traits but not statistically significant. 
  In sum, the Card and Krueger (1995) found a negative but not significant effect of 
this minimum-wage legislation on employer wealth. In spite of the insignificant outcome, 
we further examine the sources of the effect and show that market performance plays a 
relatively small role (15%). Most of the negative effect (85%) is not explained by the 
market. Differences in systematic risks and firm-specific traits contribute 46% and 38% 
to the negative excess return, respectively. Hence, our findings show that the compromise 
of the minimum wage bill and the passage in the House has an adverse effect on the 
sample companies. Economy-wide factors play a small role. 18 
 
Figure 7  November 1, 1989: Compromise bill on minimum wage reached and the 
House passed H.R. 2710 by a margin of 382 to 37 
 
 
Table 6  Event: November 1, 1989: Compromise bill on minimum wage reached and 
the House passed H.R. 2710 by a margin of 382 to 37 
Prediction: Negative Effect  Day 1-10 (%) Share 
Mean Excess Return  -.01091 
(.075326)  100% 
Explained by the Market  -.0016898*** 
(3.7288e-04)  15.49% 
Not Explained by the Market  -.0092201 
(.075327)  84.51% 
Mean Excess Return  -.01091 
(.075178)  100% 
Due to Differences in Market Performances  -.0016898*** 
(3.7288e-04)  15.49% 
Due to Differences in Systematic Risks    -.0050552** 
(.002073)  46.34% 
Due to Differences in Firm-specific Traits  -.0041648 
(.075345)  38.17% 
4.  Conclusion 
Minimum wages exist in more than one hundred countries, both industrialized and 























-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Day Relative to Event Date
Mean Excess Return Cumulative Mean Excess Return
November 1, 1989: Compromise bill on minimum wage reached19 
 
and proper. However, there is much less agreement about whether the minimum wage is 
effective at attaining these goals. Although overwhelmingly popular with the public in the 
United States, the minimum wage has, from the time of its introduction, been highly 
controversial in the political arena. In addition, minimum wages have typically received 
less support from economists, who from the very beginning of the minimum wage debate 
pointed to the potential loss of jobs stemming from a wage floor. Despite decades of 
economic research, policy debates about the costs and benefits of minimum wages 
continue to the present day. 
  Based on their comprehensive reading of the evidence, Neumark and Wascher 
(2008) argue that minimum wages do not achieve the main goals set forth by their 
supporters. They reduce employment opportunities for less-skilled workers and tend to 
reduce their earnings; they appear to have adverse longer-term effects on wages and 
earnings, in part by reducing the acquisition of human capital. In comparison with the 
vast literature on the effects of the minimum wage on employment and wages, research 
on the influence of minimum wages on firm profits has been relatively little. 
  Among the few studies, Card and Krueger (1995) examine the economic impact 
of 1989 minimum wage hike on the welfare of 110 firms which employ a 
disproportionate number of minimum-wage workers. Their results show mixed evidence 
that excess returns associated with news about the 1989 minimum-wage legislation are 
generally unsystematic and rarely seems to have effect on shareholder wealth. We present 
a simple and intuitive approach to re-examine their results by decomposing excess 
returns.  
  Our results confirm Card and Krueger (1995) by decomposing mean excess 
returns. Table 7 summarizes our key findings. We found that the apparent lack of an 
effect is a consequence of two off-setting forces: (1) a negative effect arising from firm-
specific traits (adverse information on minimum-wage worker employers) and (2) a 
positive effect arising from market performance. Our more nuanced view shows that 
while the aggregate effect of the 1989 minimum wage hike was neutral, there was a 
significant negative impact on firms that was neutralized by positive market performance.  20 
 
Table 7  Summary of Key Results 
 
Event 
Cumulative Excess Return 
in 
Card and Krueger (1995) 
Decomposition of Mean Excess Return (%) 
T= -10 to 10  T = 1 to 10    T = 1 to 10  Share 
1 
June 12, 1987 
Reagan may ease minimum wage 
stand. 
.027*  .0152* 
Mean Excess Return   .24738***  100% 
Explained by the Market      .08678*  35.08% 
Not Explained by the Market  .1606  64.92% 
Mean Excess Return   .24738***  100% 
Due to Differences in Market Performances        .086779*  35.08% 
Due to Differences in Systematic Risks        7.3119e-06  .003% 
Due to Differences in Firm-specific Traits   .1606 64.917% 
2 
March 4, 1988 
Panel votes bill to sharply boost 
minimum wage. 
-.013 -.0276*** 
Mean Excess Return  .077749 100% 
Explained by the Market          .44996***  578.72% 
Not Explained by the Market         -.37221***  -478.72% 
Mean Excess Return  .077749 100% 
Due to Differences in Market Performances          .44996***  578.72% 
Due to Differences in Systematic Risks        9.2706e-04  1.20% 
Due to Differences in Firm-specific Traits         -.37313***  -479.92% 
3 
September 27, 1988 
Democrats' bid to boost minimum 
wage this year is thwarted by GOP 
filibuster. 
.039** .0320*** 
Mean Excess Return  .42005*** 100% 
Explained by the Market          .07721***  18.38% 
Not Explained by the Market          .34283***  81.62% 
Mean Excess Return  .42005*** 100% 
Due to Differences in Market Performances          .07721***  18.38% 
Due to Differences in Systematic Risks       -4.2676e-04  -.10% 
Due to Differences in Firm-specific Traits           .34326***  81.72% 
4 
March 3, 1989 
Bush to propose raising minimum 
wage to $4.25 an hour, a lower 
training pay. 
.017 .0040 
Mean Excess Return  .12594   100% 
Explained by the Market        .10732***  85.22% 
Not Explained by the Market  .01862  14.78% 
Mean Excess Return  .12594 100% 
Due to Differences in Market Performances        .10732***  85.22% 
Due to Differences in Systematic Risks        9.8981e-04*  0.78% 21 
 
Due to Differences in Firm-specific Traits   .01763 14.00% 
5 
June 14, 1989 
Bill on raising minimum wage 
vetoed by Bush. 
.015 -.0009 
Mean Excess Return  .00919 100% 
Explained by the Market  .00786***  85.476% 
Not Explained by the Market  .00133  14.524% 
Mean Excess Return  .00919 100% 
Due to Differences in Market Performances         .007856***  85.476% 
Due to Differences in Systematic Risks   -3.6858e-04 -4.010% 
Due to Differences in Firm-specific Traits          .00170  18.534% 
6 
November 1, 1989 
Compromise bill on minimum 
wage reached. 
.002 .0024 
Mean Excess Return  -.01091 100% 
Explained by the Market       -.00169***  15.49% 
Not Explained by the Market        -.00922  84.51% 
Mean Excess Return  -.01091 100% 
Due to Differences in Market Performances       -.00169***  15.49% 
Due to Differences in Systematic Risks      -.00506**  46.34% 
Due to Differences in Firm-specific Traits          -.00416  38.17% 
Note: The sample size ranges between 102 and 108. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.22 
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Appendix 
Table A 1  110 Companies Used in the Analysis 
Company Name  Primary Industry  PERMNO*  SICCD** 
Albertson’s Inc.  Grocery Stores  50032  5411





American Stores Co.  Grocery Stores  44652  5912
Ampal American Israel Corp.  Hotels and Motels  64864 6799
Angelica Corp.  Linen Supply  45583  2337
Arden Group Inc.  Grocery Stores  14868 5410
Ark Restaurants Corp.  Eating Places  85586  5810
Bayport Restaurant Group Inc.  Eating Places  21304  5812
a
Benihana National Corp.  Eating Places  17671  5812
Brendle’s Inc.  Variety Stores  10282  5990
Brinker International Inc.  Eating Places  23297  5812
Bruno’s Inc.  Grocery Stores  19589  5411
Buffets Inc.  Eating Places  86167  5812
Carl Karcher Enterprises Inc.  Eating Places  47133  5812





Carter Hawley Hale Stores Inc.
  Department Stores  40352  5311
a
Casey’s General Stores Inc.  Grocery Stores  21742  5399





Cintas Corp.  Linen Supply  23660  7213
Chart House Enterprises Inc.  Eating Places  75815  5812
b
Club Med Inc.  Hotels and Motels  66464  7011
Consolidated Products Inc.  Eating Places  26607  5812
Consolidated Stores Corp.  Variety Stores  67467  5531
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc.  Eating Places  27562  5812
Craig Corp.  Grocery Stores  49496  5041
Crowley Milner & Co.  Department Stores  31026  5311
Dairy Mart Convenience Stores Inc.  Grocery Stores  87151  5411
Dayton Hudson Corp.  Variety Stores  49154 5311
Delchamps Inc.  Grocery Stores  29226  5411
Dial Corp. DE  Eating Places  19721 4131
Dillard Department Stores Inc.  Department Stores  49429  5311
Dollar General Corp.  Variety Stores  30382 5399
El Chico Restaurant Inc.  Eating Places  31748  5812
Family Dollar Stores Inc.  Variety Stores  53866 5331
Family Steak Houses of Florida Inc.  Eating Places  10170  5810
Federated Department Stores Inc.  Department Stores  18550 5311
a27 
 
Food Lion Inc.  Grocery Stores  37189  5411
Foodarama Supermarkets Inc.  Grocery Stores  47036 5411
Frisch’s Restaurants Inc.  Eating Places  57330  5812
G & K Services Inc.  Linen Supply  37955 7213
Gander Mountain Inc.  Miscellaneous 
Merchandise Stores  10141  5960
Giant Food Inc.  Grocery Stores  32205 5411
Gottschalks Inc.  Department Stores  69411  6711
Ground Round Restaurants Inc.  Eating Places  49736 5810
Hannaford Bros Co.  Grocery Stores  59301  5141
Healthcare Services Group Inc.  Linen Supply  41292 8059
Hilton Hotels Corp.  Hotels and Motels  23309  7011
Ingles Markets Inc.  Grocery Stores  11701 5410
Jamesway Corp.  Department Stores  48100  5311
JB’s Restaurants Inc.  Eating Places  46114 5812
Kahler Corp.  Hotels and Motels  46958  7011
Kmart Corp.  Department Stores  89757 5331
Kroger Co.  Grocery Stores  16678  5411
L. Luria & Son Inc.  Miscellaneous 
Merchandise Stores  62316 5961
La Quinta Inns Inc.  Hotels and Motels  58624  7011
Luby’s Cafeterias Inc.  Eating Places  64020 5812
Mac Frugal’s Bargain Close Outs Inc.  Variety Stores  62894  5331
Marcus Corp.  Hotels and Motels  51423 7011
Max & Erma’s Restaurants Inc.  Eating Places  51984  5812
May Department Stores Co.  Department Stores  13100 5311
McDonald’s Corp.  Eating Places  43449  5812
Mercantile Stores Co. Inc.  Department Stores  22891  5311
Morgan’s Foods Inc.  Eating Places  64442  2033
Morrison Restaurants Inc.  Eating Places  55213  5812
Motts Holdings Inc.  Grocery Stores  40731  5411
National Convenience Stores Inc.  Grocery Stores  60978  5411
a
National Pizza Co.  Eating Places  56630  5212
Neiman Marcus Group Inc.  Department Stores  75179  5311
Orient Express Hotels Inc.  Hotels and Motels  66085  7011
Pancho’s Mexican Buffet Inc.  Eating Places  61058  5812
PEC Israel Economic Corp.  Grocery Stores  66296  6052
Penn Traffic Co.  Grocery Stores  75310  5411
Pepsico Inc.  Eating Places  13856  2086
Piccadilly Cafeterias Inc.  Eating Places  62907  5812
Proffitt’s Inc.  Department Stores  11382  5311
Quality Food Centers Inc.  Grocery Stores  11215  5411
Rio Hotel & Casino Inc.  Hotels and Motels  12395  7011
Riser Foods Inc.  Grocery Stores  75359  5141
Rose’s Stores Inc.  Variety Stores  67620  5331
Ruddick Corp.  Grocery Stores  54818  228128 
 
Ryan’s Family Steak Houses Inc.  Eating Places  68049  5812
S K I Ltd.  Hotels and Motels  91636  7999
Sbarro Inc.  Eating Places  67715  5812
Schultz Sav O Stores Inc.  Grocery Stores  12253  5410
Sears Roebuck & Co.  Department Stores  14322  5311
Seaway Food Town Inc.  Grocery Stores  69682  5411
Service Merchandise Co Inc.  Miscellaneous 
Merchandise Stores  70077  5961
Shoney’s Inc.  Eating Places  70376  5812
Sizzler International Inc.  Eating Places  56354  5812
Smith’s Food & Drug Center Inc.  Grocery Stores  75602  5411
Spaghetti Warehouse Inc.  Eating Places  90676  5812
Stop & Shop Cos. Inc.  Grocery Stores  36986  5411
Strawbridge & Clothier  Department Stores  73083  5311
Stuarts Department Stores Inc.  Variety Stores  73171  5311
Thousand Trails Inc.  Hotels and Motels  76102  7033
TPI Enterprises Inc.  Eating Places  75089  5810
Tuesday Morning Corp.  Variety Stores  10094  5710
Unifirst Corp.  Linen Supply  65306  7213
United Inns Inc.  Hotels and Motels  54420  7011
Unitog Co.  Linen Supply  79410  2328
Uno Restaurant Corp.  Eating Places  75103  5812
Vicorp Restaurants Inc.  Eating Places  80654  5812
Vie de France Corp.  Eating Places  80785  5462
Volunteer Capital Corp.  Eating Places  66747  5812
Vons Cos. Inc.  Grocery Stores  22074  5411
Wal Mart Stores Inc.  Department Stores  55976  5311
Wall Street Deli Inc.  Eating Places  68743  5810
Walt Disney Co.  Amusement Parks  26403  7813
Warehouse Club Inc.  Miscellaneous 
Merchandise Stores  92997  5990
Weis Markets Inc.  Grocery Stores  42059  5411
Wendy’s International Inc.  Eating Places  63060  5812
Winn Dixie Stores Inc.  Grocery Stores  24803  5411
Woolworth Corp.  Variety Stores  15456  5331
WSMP Inc.  Eating Places  82449  5812
Note: PERMNO is a unique permanent security identification number assigned by CRSP to each security. 
SICCD is the Standard Industrial Classification Code. 
Source: Card and Krueger (1995) Table A.10.1. 
 